USA v. Nicole Faccenda by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-18-2015 
USA v. Nicole Faccenda 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Nicole Faccenda" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 263. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/263 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










 NICOLE FACCENDA, 
             Appellant  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                                            
District Court No. 2-12-cr-00536-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 16, 2015 
 
Before: SMITH, JORDAN, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 18, 2015) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Nicole Faccenda waived her right to the presentment of an indictment and pleaded 
guilty to a one-count information charging her with knowingly using and causing another 
to use a facility in interstate commerce, namely a cellular telephone, with the intent to 
commit murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).  The United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Faccenda to the statutory maximum of 120 
months.  This timely appeal followed.1   
Faccenda’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), and filed an Anders brief.  Counsel asserted that she was 
unable to present any nonfrivolous issue as a basis for disturbing the judgment of the 
District Court.2  Faccenda’s unconditional plea of guilty, counsel explained, limited the 
issues Faccenda may challenge on appeal to: whether she had a constitutional right not to 
be haled into court on the crime charged; the validity of her guilty plea; and the legality 
of the sentence.  See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam); United 
States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
None of these three issues present a reason to set aside the District Court’s 
judgment.  The facts in this matter cannot support a double jeopardy challenge.  A review 
of the guilty plea colloquy shows that the District Court conducted a careful and 
comprehensive colloquy, complying with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
2 Counsel served a copy of the Anders brief and the Appendix upon Faccenda.  
Thereafter, the Clerk’s Office notified Faccenda of her right under Local Rule 109.2(a) to 
file a pro se brief.  Faccenda has not availed herself of that opportunity.   
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U.S. 238, 242-244 (1969), and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  The sentence is 
valid as well.  Procedurally, the District Court complied with the three-step sentencing 
process set out in United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  Indeed, the 
transcript of the sentencing hearing confirms that the District Court listened to 
Faccenda’s arguments and fully considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
Substantively, the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum and it is not 
unreasonable given the circumstances in this case and the District Court’s explanation for 
imposing the 120-month sentence.  See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Nor is there any basis for challenging the requirement of restitution inasmuch 
as it is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1) and (c)(1)(A)(i).  
In sum, we agree with counsel’s assessment of Faccenda’s appeal.  Our own 
independent review of the record fails to reveal any nonfrivolous issues for appeal.  
Accordingly, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.  We certify that the issues presented in the appeal lack legal merit and 
thus do not require the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  
3d Cir. LAR 109.2(b). 
  
 
